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Abstract:  
This article considers the emergence of the phenomenon of big data and how it poses considerable 
theoretical and practical difficulties for the European Data Protection framework’s key enabling concept: 
the notion of personal data. The article starts by outlining the fact that there is an emerging body of 
opinion which suggests some of these problems might best be addressed by way of a shift to a risk 
management-based model, or models, of data protection. This, it is argued, is suggestive of the 
emergence of a possible fusion between the disciplines of data protection law and risk management. 
The article contends, however, that there are a number of severe complications associated with the 
adoption of risk management-based regulatory strategies, both generally and in the immediate context, 
which have to date, despite being widely recognised in the risk research literature, have not been 
meaningfully explored, and in some cases not considered at all, in the legal and regulatory literature 
pertaining to data protection. Consequently, these are issues in need of address.  
Whilst not intending to counsel against the adoption of risk management-based regulatory strategies in 
the big data context, the aim of this article is begin bridging the metaphorical “gap” between legal, 
regulatory, and risk research and management discourses, to stoke much-needed debate in this topical 
area, and highlight the fact that debates about risk management-based reform of the European data 
protection framework should not in any way be thought of as being concluded. To this end, the article 
presents several areas which are in need of further consideration, and where there will likely be 
possibilities for future inter-disciplinary research. 
 
 
 
 
Over the course of the last few years much has been written regarding the emergence of big data and 
how it poses considerable challenges to the effectual operation of the European data protection 
framework. In particular, it has been suggested that, as traditionally envisaged, the notion of personal 
data, the central enabling concept at the heart of European data protection law, is not fit for purpose in 
the emerging big data environment. A popular response from academics, regulatory bodies, and other 
observers, has been to suggest that the most appropriate way to respond to the challenges faced by the 
concept would be to move to a model, or models, of data protection regulation that could broadly be 
described as risk management-based.  
The notion of risk, and the analysis and management thereof, are no strangers to one another. There is, 
for example, a wealth of risk research literature dedicated to the consideration of the identification, 
quantification and analysis of risk. However, a review of the relevant literature pertaining to data 
protection law and policy reveals that hitherto little analysis has been devoted to a number of important 
issues that would have to be considered were such a regulatory shift to be initiated.1 In other words, 
despite a variety of observers advocating for the adoption of risk management-based models of data 
protection in Europe, a number of key fundamental issues well-traversed in the risk research literature 
have been overlooked. 
This article, whilst not intending to counsel against the adoption of risk management-based approaches 
to data protection law and policy, highlights a number of significant issues and complications that are 
highly pertinent in the context of risk analysis and management but have to date been underexplored in 
the data protection literature and, by beginning to bridge the gap between legal and risk research 
discourses aims to engender much needed debate in the area.  
The structure of the article is as follows. First the rationale, emergence and development of data 
protection law as a distinct field of legal practice at the European level is outlined. Second, the 
phenomenon of big data is defined, and it is examined how its emergence has caused difficulties for 
data protection law’s key enabling concept, the notion of personal data itself. The final sections of the 
article are then dedicated to a consideration of suggestions that a move to risk management-based 
models of data protection would provide an effective and desirable way to respond to and subvert the 
some of these problems. In so doing the article ultimately highlights several issues that will need to be 
more rigorously considered, and where future research will be required, if risk management-based 
models of data protection law and policy are to have any realistic prospect of success. 
1. The development of data protection law in Europe and the concept of “personal data” 
In the mid-to-late twentieth century a range of concerns over computerised processing of information, 
which was becoming particularly prominent in the private sector, spawned widespread calls for fresh 
legislative and regulatory interventions. Particularly, these calls focused on the need to protect 
individuals from potential harms and abuses, put them in a position whereby they could more readily 
                                                          
1 The literature considered specifically by this article is comprised of works authored by both academic and 
scholarly observers, as well as those produced by institutions such as the UK Information Commissioner’s 
Office and the World Economic Forum. Notable works cited include: Schwartz, P. and Solove, D. (2012) “The 
PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information”, New York University Law 
Review; Cavoukian, A. and El Emam, K. (2011) “Dispelling the Myths Surrounding De-identification: 
Anonymization Remains a Strong Tool for Protecting Privacy”, Information and Privacy Commissioner, 
Ontario, Canada; Kuan Hon, W. Millard, C. and Walden, I. “What is Regulated as Personal Data in Clouds?” in 
Cloud Computing Law, ed. by Millard, C. (2013) Oxford: Oxford University Press; Aldhouse, F. (2014) 
“Anonymisation of personal data: A missed opportunity for the European Commission”, Computer Law & 
Security Review; ICO (2012) “Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of practice”; World 
Economic Forum (2012) Rethinking Personal Data: Strengthening Trust, available at: 
http://www.weforum.org/reports/rethinking-personal-data-strengthening-trust.    
control how information about them was used, and to ensure that the free movement of data for 
economic purposes was not unduly restricted.  
In response, the Council of Europe began drafting bespoke codes of practice in response to the growing 
perception that existing legal instruments, notably the European Convention on Human Rights, were 
not suitably geared towards the achievement of these objectives.2 This period of drafting eventually 
culminated in the adoption of the Convention on Data Protection which contained basic principles for 
the processing of personal data in automated data files.3 These principles imposed various obligations 
on both organisations and individuals handling large quantities of data, and outlined rights for 
individuals as well as arrangements pertaining to institutional oversight, enforcement, and international 
cooperation.  
However, due to concerns over inconsistencies in the way in which the Convention had been 
incorporated into the national laws of Member States, and the detrimental effects this was thought to be 
having on inter-community trade,4 proposals were later brought forward by the European Commission 
for a Directive ‘On the Protection of Individuals with Regards to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the free Movement of Such Data’, later adopted as the Data Protection Directive in 1995.5 The 
underlying rationale of the Directive, as with the Convention before it, was to fulfil the dual objectives 
of facilitating the free flow of data in the internal market whilst, concurrently, protecting individuals 
from harms that may stem from the computerised, or non-computerised, processing of data.6  
In order to meet these objectives, the Directive, which at the time of writing remains the EU’s primary 
legislative instrument concerning the regulation of data-handling practices, defines personal data as 
‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’,7 and subjects the processing8 
thereof to a range of substantive rules. Article 6 of the Directive, for instance, contains a series of 
provisions relating to the quality of personal data; notably that personal data must be accurate, kept up 
to date, collected for a specified legitimate purpose, not be excessive for the purposes for which they 
were collected, and processed fairly and lawfully in a way that is not incompatible with the original 
specified legitimate purpose.9 Article 7 then provides an exhaustive list of circumstances under which 
data can be processed fairly and lawfully.10  
Unfortunately, like the Convention before it, the Directive’s existence has been troubled and wrought 
with complication. Though the Directive’s objective was to ensure an equivalent level of data protection 
                                                          
2 Bygrave, L. (2014) Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.12-
24, and Hustinx, P. “The Reform of EU Data Protection” in Emerging Challenges in Privacy Law ed. by 
Witzleb, N. et al. (2014) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp.62-71. 
3 Officially known as the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, January 1981, CETS no.108. 
4 Generally speaking, the lack of consistency between the data protection regimes of different EU Member 
States was identified as having made it difficult and onerous to transfer data across borders in a way that was 
legally compliant. In turn, this was thought to be inimical to the development of economically and socially 
advantageous data processing activities. For an overview of these issues, see: Lloyd, I. (2017) Information 
Technology Law: Oxford: Oxford University Press, pg.40. 
5 Directive 95/46/EC. [hereinafter, the Data Protection Directive] 
6 Perhaps ironically, however, some observers have suggested that the evolution of data protection law at the 
European level has acted as major obstacle to free international data flows, rather than a facilitator. See: Kong, 
L. (2010) “Data Protection and Transborder Data Flow in the European and Global Context”, The European 
Journal of International Law 21(2). 
7 Article 2 (a) Data Protection Directive. 
8 The Directive defines processing broadly, as ‘…any operation or set of operations which is performed upon 
personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction’. See: Ibid., Article 2 (b) 
9 Ibid., Article 6 
10 Ibid., Article 7 (a) 
within the EU, a considerable divergence in the way its provisions have been applied across member 
states has been observable throughout its lifespan.11 As a consequence, a not insignificant number of 
data controllers, particularly those operating online, have been left in a position of having to potentially 
deal with 28 different national data protection laws, creating a fragmented legal environment rife with 
uncertainty and unequal protection for individuals. 12  Moreover, advancements in information 
technology, notably the emergence of new data mining and analytical technologies, have given rise to 
fresh concerns in respect of the Directive’s efficacy.  
These anxieties led to the European Commission presenting a package of proposals designed to update 
and modernise the European data protection framework in January 2012. Significantly, the package 
contained a proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation13 to replace the apparently outdated 
Directive. This proposal was subject to intense discussion before trilogue discussions between the 
European Commission, Parliament, and Council were concluded in December 2015, resulting in an 
agreed final text which will apply in all EU Member States from May 2018.14  
This drive to revise the data protection framework should have represented an excellent opportunity to 
re-assess the central tenets of data protection law, and undertake a challenging exercise in how to 
develop a new structure by which modern data-handling practices could be regulated. However, despite 
the apparent intention of European lawmakers to modernise the data protection framework, the text of 
the General Data Protection Regulation still retains, and places a great deal of emphasis on, many of 
the core concepts that were integral to the Directive before it, notably the notion of personal data itself. 
Using an approach similar to the Directive before it, the Regulation defines personal data as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”,15  and makes it clear that the 
processing thereof is subject to a number of substantive rules and conditions.16  
From this brief overview of key EU legislation in the data protection field we are immediately able to 
identify the data protection framework’s key enabling concept: personal data itself. The Directive and 
Regulation alike are primarily concerned with the regulation of the processing of personal data, and the 
key substantive rules and provisions of each are exclusively engaged in situations where data processing 
operations involve data that are “personal”. Conversely, the same substantive rules and provisions are 
not engaged in situations where no personal data are involved. In so doing, the data protection 
framework appears to operate under the assumption that there exists a hard dichotomy between data 
which are personal and those which are not. 
The continued reliance on the concept of personal data in this key central role in the data protection 
framework seemingly reflects the belief of European lawmakers that the concept of personal data 
remains a fundamentally useful construct around which to build a regulatory framework for 
contemporary data-handling activities. The continued faith being placed in this concept, however, 
should give us pause. Not only has the notion of personal data proved troublesome to date, but there is 
                                                          
11 For instance, in the Analysis and impact study on the implementation of Directive EC 95/46 in it was revealed 
that, amongst other divergences, the national data protection regimes of Member States contained inconsistent 
and contrasting definitions of a number of key terms, notably “data controller” and “consent”. Analysis and 
Impact Study on the implementation of Directive EC 95/46 in Member States. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/lawreport/consultation/technical-annex_en.pdf  
12 Reding, V. (2012) “The European data protection framework for the twenty-first century”, International Data 
Privacy Law. 
13 Officially known as Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 
14 Available at: http://static.ow.ly/docs/Regulation_consolidated_text_EN_47uW.pdf 
15 Article 4(a) General Data Protection Regulation. 
16 See: Arts 4-11 General Data Protection Regulation. 
reason to suspect that, as traditionally envisaged, it may be entirely unfit for purpose in an age of big 
data. 
2. Big Data and its implications for the concept of personal data 
Generally speaking, big data can be considered a loosely defined term, which is broadly used to describe 
datasets that are so large and complex they have become awkward to work with using standard statistical 
software, or data which are too large to be stored, managed, or analysed in a single organisation.17 
Essentially, the existence of such datasets is made possible by the unprecedented, and exponentially 
increasing, amount of data produced and put into circulation in the world today.18  
As noted by boyd19 and Crawford, however, big data is in many ways a poor term. In their words, there 
is little doubt that the quantities of data now available in the world are often huge, but that is not the 
defining feature of this new data ecosystem.20 Big data is less about data that are big, and more about 
increased capacities to search, aggregate, and cross-reference large datasets.21 A better, or at least more 
nuanced way of defining big data, therefore, might be to consider it to be a cultural, technological, and 
scholarly phenomenon that rests on the interplay of: 
‘1. Technology: maximizing computation power and algorithmic accuracy to gather, analyse, 
link and compare large datasets. 
2. Analysis: drawing on large data sets to identify patterns in order to make economic, social, 
technical and legal claims. 
3. Mythology: the widespread belief that large data sets offer a higher form of intelligence and 
knowledge that can generate insights that were previously impossible, with the aura of truth, 
objectivity, and accuracy.’22 
As alluded to by boyd and Crawford, working with datasets of such extraordinary size and scale allows 
for those in possession of sophisticated analytical tools to identify patterns, and make inferences and 
predictions that would not have previously been possible when working with datasets of a smaller size. 
Significantly, this may often entail data that have been collected for a specific purpose being repurposed 
to serve an entirely different end.  
In other words, big data are large volumes of inter-connected data that can be stored, processed, and 
shared in ways that allow us to develop a richer, deeper analysis and picture of what those data 
represent.23 The types of scenarios which would fall within these categories can range drastically, from 
data derived from vast international science projects the Large Hadron Collider of the European 
                                                          
17 Snijders, C. et al. (2012) “Big Data”: Big Gaps of Knowledge in the Field of Internet Science”, International 
Journal of Internet Science, pg.1. 
18 For instance, The Economist reported in its 2013 Outlook that the quantity of global digital data expanded 
from 130 exabytes in 2005, to 1,227 in 2010, and will have increased to 7,910 by 2015 – to highlight the 
enormous quantity of this amount of data in lay terms, the 1,227 exabytes of data, if stored on DVDs, would 
require a fleet of 16 million Boeing 747 aircraft in order to transport it globally. The Economist (last accessed 
August 2014) “Welcome to the yotta world”, http://www.economist.com/node/2153792 
19 In accordance with her wishes, this article refers to danah boyd using lower case letters only. 
20 Some of the data encompassed by big data, for instance trending Twitter posts, will not be as large as earlier 
datasets that we not considered big data, such as national censuses. 
21 boyd, d. and Crawford, K. (2012) “Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a cultural, technological, 
and scholarly phenomenon”, Information, Communication and Society 
22 Ibid., pg.663. 
23 Williamson, A. (2014) “Big Data and the implications for government”, Legal Information Management. 
Organization for Nuclear Research, to the wealth of data collated by online companies such as Facebook 
and Google.24  
Big data is, therefore, gathered from a vast, and constantly increasing, array of sources, ranging from 
data gathered online through the use of services like social networking sites and search engines, credit 
and debit card activity, scientific and medical experiments, the use of financial services, and 
increasingly, the use of sensor networks, surveillance cameras, and the rollout of pervasive computing 
technologies, often referred to as the Internet of Things.25 Moreover, not only have analytical capacities 
soared, but they have also become far more inexpensive and widely distributed. Modern mobile devices 
such as telephones and tablets possess more computing power than the desktop computers of a decade 
ago, and it is now possible to link data and devices virtually so that huge computational tasks can be 
undertaken affordably and conveniently.26 
Whilst big data’s latent value is seemingly huge, and its uses are likely to lead to a significant number 
of benefits, both social and economic in nature, it has also been noted that certain big data analytics 
operations may also be capable of causing harmful and undesirable consequences for individuals, and 
thus they require regulation. In particular, automated-algorithmic profiling, a key constituent part of 
many big data analytics operations, has been identified as having the potential to lead to discriminatory 
practices and, as a result, the diminution of individual autonomy.27 An in-depth examination of these 
issues is beyond the scope of this article. What is significant to this article, however, is the fact that 
many big data analytics operations, regardless of their consequences, will involve the processing of 
personal data and so will fall under the jurisdiction of the European data protection framework. As 
alluded to above, however, there are a number of difficulties that necessarily rise when attempting to 
apply the concept of personal data itself in the big data environment. 
As outlined above, the concept of ‘personal data’ is of fundamental importance to the European data 
protection framework. This is reflected in the texts of both the Data Protection Directive and the 
imminent General Data Protection Regulation, the substantive provisions on which apply exclusively 
to data which are personal, and not to those which aren’t. This is made clear in the Directive’s recitals 
where it is specified that the principles of data protection apply exclusively to data which are ‘personal’, 
and are categorically not applicable to data which have been rendered anonymous in such a way that an 
individual cannot be identified or considered to be identifiable by all means ‘likely reasonably to be 
used’ by any data controller or other person who sought to make such an identification. 28 This provision 
                                                          
24 Fishleigh, J. (2014) “A non-technical journey into the world of Big Data: an introduction”, Legal Information 
Management 
25 Rubinstein, I. “Big Data: A Pretty Good Privacy Solution” Future of Privacy Forum and the Stanford Center 
for Internet & Society’s “Big Data and Privacy: Making Ends Meet” Workshop 2013; Kuner, C. et al. (2012) 
“The challenge of ‘big data’ for data protection”, International Data Privacy Law 2(2), pg.47. 
26 Ibid 
27 See: Hildebrandt, M. (2008) “Profiling and the Rule of Law”, IDIS, pp.55-70; Schiller, B. (2014) “First 
Degree Prince Discrimination Using Big Data”, Brandeis University; Cumbley, R. and Church, P. (2013) “Is 
“Big Data” creepy?”, Computer Law & Security Review 29(5); Magnani, L. “Abducing personal data, 
destroying privacy: diagnosing profiles through artificial mediators” in Privacy, Due Process and the 
Computational Turn: The philosophy of law meets the philosophy of technology, ed. by Hildebrandt, M. and de 
Vries, J. (2013) Oxon, Routledge; Hildebrandt, M. (2008) “Profiling and the Rule of Law”, Identity in the 
Information Society, pp.55-70; Bollier, D. (2010) “The Promise and Peril of Big Data”, The Aspen Institute; 
Tene, O. (2010) “Privacy: The new generations”, International Data Privacy Law. It should also be noted that 
big data analytics may also pose risks to those whose personal data are not swallowed up by these sorts of 
activities. There remain billions of people in the world today who remain on the margins of such activities and 
their inherent implications, simply because they do not routinely engage in activities that advanced analytics are 
designed to capture. It has been suggested that such individuals, despite their non-participation, may still find 
themselves subject to new forms of inequality and subordination. On this issue, see: Lerman, J. (2013) “Big 
Data and its Exclusions”, Stanford Law Review Online. 
28 Recital 26 Data Protection Directive 
is again mostly retained in the recitals of the General Data Protection Regulation, which specify that 
the principles of data protection should only apply to information concerning an identifiable or 
identified natural person, and that when attempting to determine whether a person is identifiable account 
should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used to identify them.29 
As alluded to in the article’s previous section, however, the concept of personal data has endured a 
troubled existence. Reaching an understanding as to precisely which types of information fall within its 
definition, for instance, has proved problematic for courts,30 and much academic and regulatory ink has 
been devoted to its elucidation.31 However, the emergence of big data and the possibilities inherent in 
its associated analytical operations has fundamentally cast considerable doubt on the continued 
suitability of the law making a distinction between data which are personal data and those which are 
not, and treating these categories of data differently.  
The original rationale for this distinction appears to have been an underlying belief held by the drafters 
of early data protection legislation that data which are non-personal cannot be related to an individual, 
and therefore the processing of such data will not entail any threats to any specific person and so should 
not be subject to the full remit of data protection law’s substantive rules. Concurrently, anonymisation 
techniques – processes by which data can be manipulated to make it more difficult, or effectively 
impossible, to link individual persons to whom they relate – have traditionally been widely used by data 
controllers to render data they have at their disposal anonymous, allowing them to share, analyse, 
disclose or sell those data without engaging data protection rules  
Advances in re-identification methods made possible by the emergence of big data, however, have 
meant that the suggestion that it is impossible for individuals to be identified, and suffer resultant harms, 
when identifying information is removed from a dataset has effectively lost all scientific basis. 
Seminally, in 2008 Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov of the University of Texas demonstrated 
that by applying their bespoke de-anonymisation methodology to the Netflix Prize dataset,32 which 
contained anonymised film ratings of 500,000 Netflix subscribers – the world’s largest online film 
rental service – it would be possible for an adversary who possessed minimal information about an 
individual subscriber to easily identify said subscriber’s record in the dataset. By using the Internet 
Movie Database33 as a source of background knowledge, Narayanan and Shmatikov were able to 
successfully identify a number of the Netflix records of known users, and, as a result, uncovered their 
apparent political preferences and other potentially sensitive information.34  
More recently, in a 2010 study, it was demonstrated that information about the membership of groups 
on social networking sites (i.e. information regarding Facebook groups, and similar, to which an 
individual user belongs) will often be sufficient to uniquely identify an individual, or at the very least 
identify a category of people in which the individual can be pinpointed. Building on the abovementioned 
work of Narayanan and Schmatikov, which showed that statistical methods can be used to de-
                                                          
29 Recital 26 General Data Protection Regulation 
30 See, for instance: Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 
31 See, for instance: Millard, C. and Kuan Hon, (2012) “Defining ‘Personal Data’ in e-Social Science”, 
Information, Communication and Society; Welfare, D. (2012) “Clarifying the scope of personal data”, Privacy 
& Data Protection. See also: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, WP 136; United Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office (2007) “Determining what is 
personal data”. 
32 The Netflix Prize was an open competition held by Netflix, where entrants were provided an anonymized 
dataset of over 100,000,000 film ratings, and invited to improve on Netflix’s film recommendation algorithm, 
without any other information about Netflix’s users being provided. See: Netflix (accessed June 2014) “The 
Netflix Prize Rules”, http://www.netflixprize.com//rules 
33 The Internet Movie Database is an online database containing information relating to films, and other media. 
www.imdb.com 
34 Narayanan, A. and Shmatikov, V. (2008) “Robust De-anonymization of Large Datasets (How to Break 
Anonymity of the Netflix Prize Dataset)”, University of Texas at Austin. 
anonymize data through the cross-correlation of datasets, Wondracek et al showed that the identification 
of a particular individual could be made using only information from a single social networking site 
and combining it with the browsing history of a user, without the need to correlate it with other auxiliary 
information.35 Even more recently, additional studies have shown that, due to human mobility traces 
being highly unique, even supposedly anonymised location data can be linked to a particular individual 
with relative ease if correlated with a piece of outside information.36 
The inference to be drawn from these findings is that, quite simply, the use of anonymisation techniques 
and the removal of all obvious personal identifiers from datasets will, in many instances, not prevent 
individuals from being identified and, as a result, will not equate to the potential harms inherent in 
contemporary data processing activities being solved by technology rather than law or other regulatory 
interventions. In simple terms, in a world of big data, anonymisation techniques will often fail to render 
data truly anonymous, as there are quite simply too many data ‘out there’ online, in publicly available 
repositories, which can be used to link specific identities to records in datasets that have supposedly 
been anonymised through the use of conventional techniques.  
The challenges posed to the law by the limits of anonymisation techniques were first brought to the 
attention of the legal world in 2009 by Paul Ohm in his influential article, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: 
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization’.37 Here Ohm outlined how, as outlined above, 
the European data protection framework implicitly embraces the assumption that anonymisation 
provides a ‘silver bullet’ against harms stemming from the processing of data, and suggested that, given 
the ease with which individuals can now be identified from data which have supposedly been 
anonymised, and since theoretically all data can now be related to an identifiable individual, the 
processing of non-personal data should theoretically be subject to the same conditions and legal 
safeguards as the processing of data which are personal. 
In Ohm’s eyes, therefore, the hard dichotomy prevalent in data protection legislation surrounding the 
treatment of data which are personal and those which are not should, therefore, be abandoned since this 
is a distinction which has become severely and irreversibly blurred.38 Though Ohm’s line of argument 
is not universally accepted, 39  it seems now that a consensus has emerged between scholars and 
policymakers that enough work has been done to dispel the once widely-held idea that anonymisation 
is a panacea to the risks associated with contemporary data-handling practices.  
When introducing the Data Protection Directive in 1995, by defining ‘personal data’ as any information 
that could be related to an individual, either directly or indirectly, EU lawmakers seemingly envisioned 
items like documents with an identification number, or other small pieces of information that could be 
used to link data to the identity of a specific individual. Today, in a world of big data, this definition 
evidently encompasses far more information than could ever have been imagined at the point of the 
Directive’s inception approximately twenty years ago.40  
Nevertheless, despite these complications, as noted above, the impending General Data Protection 
Regulation retains the concept of personal data as its central tenet, and once again subjects the 
                                                          
35 Wondracek, G. et al. (2010) “A Practical Attack to De-Anonymize Social Network Users”, IEEE Symposium 
on Security and Privacy. pg.237. 
36 See: de Montjoye, Y. (2013) “Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility”, Scientific 
Reports. 
37 Ohm, P. (2009) “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization”, 
UCLA Law Review, pg.1707. 
38 Ibid 
39 Some notable observers continue to put faith in anonymisation as being a vital tool in the quest to protect 
individuals against harms and abuses associated with the processing of data. See, for example: Cavoukian, A. 
and El Emam, K. (n 1).  
40 Tucker, P. (2013) “Has Big Data Made Anonymity Impossible?”, MIT Technology Review, Kuan Hon, W. 
Millard, C. and Walden, I. (n 1). 
processing thereof to its substantive rules. The wording of the Regulation makes it clear that personal 
data is to remain a binary concept, and presupposes the existence of a conclusive divide between data 
which are personal and those which are not. This is clearly problematic as there are now notable reasons 
to doubt that in its traditionally envisaged form the notion of personal data remains a suitable construct 
upon which to base a wide-ranging legislative framework for the regulation of big data analytics. 
Accordingly, the questions raised by Ohm regarding the continuing suitability of laws framed around a 
dichotomy over data which are personal, and those which are not, remain pertinent and in need of 
address. 
3. A risk management-based approach to the concept of personal data? 
The previous sections of the article have outlined how, despite big data posing apparently severe 
problems to the operation of data protection law’s key concept: personal data, European lawmakers 
apparently remain strongly committed to its continued use in both current and prospective data 
protection regulatory regimes. Evidently, however, personal data is a concept that can no longer 
function as traditionally envisaged. Accordingly, it seems beyond doubt that fresh approaches to its 
understanding and application will be required if it is to have greater meaning and practical value big 
data environment.41 Whilst a number of varied proposals have emerged in respect of how the notion of 
personal data might be refined or adapted to render it more fit for purpose in this context,42  the 
suggestion that the abovementioned difficulties might best be addressed by way of a shift to risk 
management-based approach to the concept is becoming increasingly prominent.  
Generally speaking, risk management-based approaches to regulation can be described as regulatory 
strategies that involve the targeting of enforcement and resources on the basis of assessments of the 
risks that a particular regulated activity poses to the regulator’s objectives.43 The key components of 
these assessments will be the evaluations of the risks of noncompliance and calculations pertaining to 
the impact that said noncompliance may have on the regulatory body’s ability to achieve its objectives. 
In its idealised form, therefore, risk management-based regulation offers an evidence-based means of 
targeting the use of resources and of prioritising attention to the highest risks in accordance with a 
transparent, systematic, and defensible framework.44  
Over the course of at least the last ten years there has been an observable rise in regulators adopting risk 
management-based frameworks of supervision worldwide, particularly with respect to regulatory issues 
regarding the environment, food safety, occupational health, and financial services.45 As alluded to 
above, however, in accordance with the rise of big data we are now seeing the emergence of proposals 
for risk management-based regulatory strategies to be adopted as a means of repairing the areas of 
European data protection law that have come under strain. In particular, calls for the adoption of a risk 
management-based approach to the concept of personal data have become prominent. 
For instance, in response to the difficulties associated with the concept of personal data which, as 
highlighted above, were outlined by Ohm in 2009, Cavoukian and El Emam argue that despite 
anonymisation’s shortcomings, it may in some instances remain an effective mode of concealing 
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individuals’ identities. In their words, Ohm’s earlier work on anonymisation merely highlighted the fact 
that one cannot look to such techniques in the hope of securing absolute guarantees of anonymity.46 
Precisely when the use of such techniques will be effective at rendering data truly anonymous will 
depend on the consideration of a variety of factors. In sum, in the emerging big data environment, 
whether information and data can be used to identify, or re-identify, an individual will depend on 
technology and practices that entail the linking of supposedly anonymised data with information and 
data that already identify an individual. Moreover, as additional pieces of data that identify, or are 
capable of identifying, individuals become available (e.g. as individuals make accessible more and more 
of their details in public locations, such as social networking sites) it will become ever more simple to 
link them to anonymised data, because there will likely be more elements in common that can be used 
to make a match. 
Identifiability, therefore, will depend on context. Accordingly, it is unrealistic to rely on the hollow 
premise that there exists a sharp divide between data which are intrinsically personal and those which 
are not.47 For instance, an individual Google search for ‘poodles’ may not be enough to identify an 
individual, but a collection of queries when cross analysed, or a highly specific search, might be. At 
some point the identification of an individual will be possible from most types of data, but when will 
depend entirely on circumstance.48  
Rather than discarding personal data as a regulatory construct, recognising that data protection law does 
not require an absolute guarantee of non-identifiability for data to fall outside the definition of personal 
data, Cavoukian and El Emam argue in favour of a reshuffle of the existing legislative framework to a 
model of personal data based on the idea of a risk of harm continuum rather than a hard dichotomy 
between personal and non-personal data. Under this heading data would only constitute personal data, 
and thus the processing thereof would only become subject to regulation, if there was a significant risk 
of identification and/or harm. A shift to such a model would allow for the concept of personal data to 
be retained as an important regulatory construct, but would circumvent some of the problems associated 
with its traditional binary nomenclature that have come about due to the emergence of big data. 
Support for a shift to a risk management-based model of personal data can be found not only in the 
work of Cavoukian and El Emam, but in a number of other sources. For instance, in its 2012 report, 
entitled Rethinking Personal Data: Strengthening Trust,49 the World Economic Forum proposed that 
rather than continuing to frame data protection laws around a binary black and white dichotomy, 
whereby data are either categorically personal or non-personal, it would be preferable to shift to a new 
paradigm of data protection completely, based on the idea of context and risk. Rather than focusing on 
data itself, data protection laws constructed on this premise would take a contextual and risk-based 
approach to the different uses of data and how linked the usage is to a particular individual before 
determining whether the processing of such data should be subject to legal rules.50  
The anonymisation code of practice, published by the UK Information Commissioner’s Office51 in 
November 2012 advocates a seemingly similar approach. Noting that the substantive provisions of data 
protection law do not require an absolute guarantee of non-identifiability to avoid being invoked, the 
Information Commissioner advises that data should only be considered personal when the risk of 
identification is more than reasonably likely. Though the code notes that making determinations over 
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whether data ought to be considered personal, or sufficiently anonymised so to render them non-
personal, will in many instances be far from straightforward, it sets forth a number of good practice 
recommendations for data handlers. To assess the risk-of re-identification, the ICO recommends that 
organizations evaluate whether any other person could identify an individual from the anonymised data, 
either by itself or in combination with other available information, at present or in the future. When 
considering ‘other information’, the Code recommends organisations adopt a ‘motivated intruder’ test, 
which would entail asking whether an individual, or individuals, could be re-identified by someone who 
is “reasonably competent, has access to resources…and would employ investigative techniques such as 
making enquiries of people who may have additional knowledge of the identity of the data subject.”52  
Numerous leading scholars have also added their voice the claim that a risk and context-based approach 
to personal data should be formally recognised and reflected in legal reform. For instance, Kuan Hon 
et al, whilst noting that current data protection law already requires data controllers to undertake a 
consideration of specific circumstances when assessing which data are personal and which are not, 
suggest assessing the risks of identification and harm posed by a particular processing operation would 
not seem a great deal more burdensome than determining whether that information is ‘personal’.53 They 
note that the definition of personal data is currently the single trigger for applying all of the law’s 
requirements but, on this definition, given the abovementioned scientific advancements in re-
identification techniques, almost all data could qualify as such, highlighting the limits of the personal 
data concept in its current framing. A more suitable and practical approach, they suggest, would be to 
consider data to be personal data only when there is a realistic risk of an individual being identified or 
harmed from those data being processed. They go on to suggest a two-stage test: a technologically 
neutral, accountability-based approach to address the types of concerns the personal data concept is 
intended to address. First, appropriate technical and organisational measures should be taken to 
minimise identification risk. Only then, if the resulting risk of identification remains sufficiently high, 
should data be considered personal data and trigger data protection obligations. Second, the risk of harm 
and its likely severity should then be assessed and appropriate measures taken.54  
Aldhouse agrees, and suggests that the law should not speak of any firm divide between identifiability 
and non-identifiability. Furthermore, in his view, the law should be framed in terms which dictate that 
the application of its principles must be driven by considerations such as the nature of the data in 
question, the purposes for which it is to be used, the possible motivation of an adversary, the means 
available to such a person, and the extent of the harm the data subject would experience as a result of 
identification.55 
From this overview of some important responses to the challenges posed by big data to the notion of 
personal data, it is evident there is a growing appetite from both regulatory bodies and other observers 
for a risk management-based approach to the concept. The key driver of these suggestions appears to 
be the underlying belief that the substantive rules of the European data protection framework should 
only be engaged when there is a clear risk of individuals being identified, or harmed, as a consequence 
of certain data being processed. As a corollary, the proposals for reform considered above seemingly 
suggest that said substantive rules should not be engaged when the risk of individuals being identified 
or harmed as a result of certain data being processed is negligible. Effectively, therefore, the adoption 
and enactment of these proposals would effectively render the enforcement of data protection law an 
exercise in risk management. Accordingly, they can be grouped together and defined as risk 
management-based approaches to data protection law and policy. Given the way in which the adoption 
of risk management-based models of data protection would apparently nullify and dissolve some of the 
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problems currently observable in the data protection framework, they seemingly have considerable 
potential.  
There, is, however, a problem. From the proposals for a shift to risk management-based model of 
personal data considered above it is possible to infer a possible presumption on behalf of the respective 
proponents that the construction and administration of risk management-based models of regulation in 
this vein would be relatively straightforward. Risk management is, however, a discipline in its own 
right, and boasts a wealth of academic literature and research geared towards the understanding of 
difficulties inherent in the identification, evaluation, and minimisation of risks arising from complex 
situations.  
The remainder of the article is dedicated to a consideration of some severe difficulties inherent in the 
construction and application of a risk management-based models of personal data, and argues that the 
proponents thereof have too-readily eschewed, or have otherwise failed to consider, a number of 
complications and challenges that have been well documented in the risk research literature. In so doing, 
it attempts to bridge the gap between legal and risk research disciplines, and identify where further 
debate and research is needed in this topical area. 
4. Risk management-based approaches to the concept of personal data: a risky regulatory 
approach?  
The previous section of this article highlighted the fact that there is evidently a growing body of opinion 
which advocates for the adoption of a risk management-based approach to the concept of personal data 
as a means of responding to big data’s emergent challenges. This is perhaps reflective of the general 
global trend of regulators adopting risk management-based strategies to manage their resources and 
reputations that has been observable for at least the best part of a decade.56  
As alluded to above, however, there are several challenges inherent in the adoption of risk management-
based regulatory strategies that, despite being well-traversed in the risk research literature, have not, to 
date, been rigorously addressed by those advocating a regulatory shift in the manner outlined above. 
These challenges can generally be separated into two categories: challenges of design, and challenges 
of enforcement and application.  
4.1. Challenges of design 
The first challenges encountered by regulators and lawmakers when attempting to devise any risk 
management-based model of personal data will occur in the design stage. Primarily, arguably the most 
significant challenge associated with the design of risk management-based regulatory regimes in 
general terms is the fact that, as noted above, such frameworks necessarily require an assessment, or 
assessments, of any possible harms that may emanate from the activity, or activities, that are the target 
of regulation, and the likelihood of them occurring.  
Risk management-based approaches to regulation presume, therefore, that regulators will be well 
positioned to comprehensively discern the level of risk inherent in the activity or object that is to be 
regulated. In some scenarios this will be straightforward as there may, for example, be a high number 
of incidents from which data on the risk of any potential harm arising from a particular situation can be 
assessed. In other scenarios, however, regulators will be confronted with situations and events from 
which reliable probabilistic calculations cannot easily be drawn, or with conditions of uncertainty in 
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which the risk in question is inherently insusceptible to probabilistic assessment.57 This is a point that 
has been well-noted in the risk research literature.58  
Significantly, however, it is likely that many data processing activities which take place in the big data 
environment are likely to fall within the latter category. In other words, determining the level of risk of 
harm inherent in a particular big data analytics operation will in numerous instances be extremely 
complicated. Firstly, given the inherently uncertain nature of big data, in many circumstances it will be 
difficult, if not impossible to indicate what the potential harms associated with a particular processing 
operation, and the severity thereof, might be.59  Secondly, even if the nature of such harms were 
calculable, determining the likelihood of them actually occurring could in itself also often be 
tremendously challenging.  
Despite expressly advocating in favour of a shift to a risk management-based model of data protection, 
this is a point that is acknowledged by the abovementioned ICO anonymization code of practice: 
‘…the risk of re-identification through data linkage is essentially unpredictable as it can never 
be assessed with certainty what data is already available or what data may be released in the 
future.’60 
This dearth of knowledge or understanding will have obvious, but potentially severe, implications for 
those wishing to undertake an analysis as to whether a particular data processing activity carries with 
it, or does not carry, a risk of harm and the likelihood of that harm occurring.  
For instance, when attempting to adopt the ICO’s motivated intruder test in order to determine whether 
data should be considered “personal”, as outlined above, questions over what ‘other information’ might 
be ‘out there’ capable of identifying an individual, as well as how many ‘motivated intruders’ exist – 
and what their desires, capabilities and background knowledge are – both now and in the future, will in 
many instances be answerable only on the basis of conjecture. Particularly, by asking data controllers 
to consider what information might be ‘out there’ at a later point in time, the ICO effectively asks that 
that data controllers predict the future and, as is widely accepted in general discourse, the future is 
inherently unpredictable; the course of technological evolution, and the effect it has had on data 
protection law and policy to date, should be sufficient to illustrate this point.  
In any event, despite acknowledging that the level of risk associated with data processing in the big data 
environment will often be unknowable, the ICO nonetheless invites data controllers to undertake such 
assessments themselves. As has been suggested elsewhere, however, such is the complexity of making 
such calculations, in reality the only people who will have a chance of making an accurate assessment 
over the true risks associated with big data analytics operations are expert statisticians.61 This in itself 
is troublesome. Basing a regulatory framework on the basis of risks that can likely be determined, much 
less understood, only by those with considerable expertise would surely be ill-advised.62 It is one thing 
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62 This point was famously recognised by the American legal philosopher, Lon Fuller, who, in his seminal work, 
The Morality of Law, published in 1964, argued that the rules of any ‘good’ system of law must be 
understandable to those to whom they apply. Fuller, L (1969) The Morality of Law, New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press. It might also be argued that the existence of a system of law which had non-
understandable rules would also be contra to the principle of legality and the rule of law itself, both of which 
for the terms of such a law to be understandable by experts, and quite another for it to be understood by 
all the individual data controllers to whom such a law would apply. As has already been widely noted 
in the literature, one of the primary faults with the existing European data protection framework is its 
scale and complexity.63  Shifting to a model of regulation which would invite data controllers to 
determine which data are likely to cause harm or lead to the identification of a person on the basis of a 
risk that is essentially unknowable to anyone without expertise in the fields of statistics and computer 
science would surely only exacerbate these existing problems.  
Whilst these issues will surely prove to be extremely problematic, however, they may not necessarily 
prove to be fundamental. The very nature of risk management, after all, is to ensure that uncertainties, 
such as those described above, do not unduly impede societal or organisational goals. In other words, 
risk analysis and risk management are theoretically designed to deal with this exact kind of situation. 
In addition to the abovementioned design issues, however, what is perhaps more, or at least equally 
problematic in the context of proposals for a shift to a risk management-based approach to personal 
data is that its proponents appear, for the most part, to have overlooked the fact that there is more than 
one prominent methodology that can be used to identify and analyse risks, each with their own strengths 
and weaknesses. These different approaches and methodologies, as is noted in the risk research 
literature, have been extensively empirically tested in practice.64 Acknowledgement of, much less any 
consideration of which, if any, of the prominent models of risk analysis and management would be 
suitable for use in the context of a risk management-based approach to personal data is something that 
is notably absent from the relevant data protection literature. This is troubling, as surely if risk 
management-based approaches to data protection are to have any success the determination of which 
methodology for assessing risk is appropriate in this context is something that needs to be considered 
in depth from their very outset.  
In any event, difficult as they may be, deliberations regarding the identification and quantification of 
risks in the big data context may only be the tip of the proverbial iceberg so far as designing risk 
management-based approach to personal data may be concerned. Another highly salient question that 
would also have to be confronted by regulators as a part of the design process of such an initiative, but 
to date has been paid scant attention, would be how best to determine the regulatory appetite for risk; 
that is to say, even if the level of risk associated with a particular big data analytics operation could be 
accurately assessed, the above difficulties in doing so notwithstanding, what type of risks ought to be 
considered tolerable, and to what extent? In addition to this there are broader questions to be asked in 
respect of who should be making these determinations. Should, for instance, the acceptable level of risk 
be determined by politicians and lawmakers, regulators, or individuals themselves? These questions 
will likely prove difficult to answer, and should not be hastily eschewed or dismissed.  
As noted by Black and Baldwin, for instance, that it is normally for regulators and policymakers 
themselves to set an acceptable level of risk, and that in practice a regulator’s risk tolerance will often 
ultimately be driven by a variety of different considerations:  
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“All regulators face political risk, the risk that what they consider to be an acceptable level of 
risk will be higher than that tolerated by politicians, the media, and the public, and that the 
uncertainties they face will be unrecognized and/or not tolerated.”65 
Allowing policymakers and regulators to determine the acceptable level of risk in respect of any risk 
management-based approach to the concept of personal data would, however, likely prove troublesome. 
It might be asked, for instance, by what metric should regulators assess the acceptability of a particular 
risk inherent in a particular big data analytics operation when, in reality, notions of acceptability will 
be viewed differently from one person to another, as well as being assessed quite differently by 
supposed experts, such as data analysts and privacy regulators?  
Perhaps because of questions like this it has been suggested by leading risk researchers that whilst the 
technical expertise of regulators may be of use in determining the average probability of an adverse 
effect linked to an object or activity, it is public perception that should invariably govern the selection 
of criteria on which the acceptability or tolerability of a risk are to be judged.66 Even if this logic was 
to be universally accepted, however, due to the divergence of views between different cross-sections of 
the European populace this would be far from the end of the potential complications.  
As noted by Brownsword, for instance, there are at least three major ethical constituencies with a 
significant presence within contemporary Europe. Namely, these are Utilitarian, rights-based, and so-
called ‘dignitarian’ schools of thought, each of which has a differing attitude to the concept of risk.67 
For the Utilitarian constituency, risk speaks to a concern about safety, that is to say, safety relative to 
any conditions that are material to the maximisation of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Utilitarians 
will want to know what the cost of a risk is; and that the anticipated net result of running said risk is 
greater to that of not doing so.68 For members of the rights-based constituency, the notion of risk speaks 
to a concern over possible infringements of fundamental rights and values. In the same way that 
Utilitarians may want to consider what price (qua loss of utility) is being paid as a result of running a 
particular risk, rights-based theorists will want to know whether the running of said risk comes at an 
acceptable price relative to competing or conflicting rights.69 Conversely, those of the Dignitarian 
constituency regard the compromising of human dignity as a self-standing reason for restraint, the 
notion of risk does not enter into such an ethic in quite the same way. For Dignitarians, to propose that 
we should exercise precaution against the risk that undesirable consequences may materialise if we fail 
to do so is to miss the point. If a certain action entails the possibility of compromising human dignity, 
then regulation should de facto prohibit it, irrespective of any other considerations.70  
Applying this brief sketch of competing ethical outlooks to the notion of adopting a risk management-
based approach to the concept of personal data we might deduce the following. A Utilitarian theorist 
might hold the view that substantive data protection rules should only be engaged when the risk that a 
particular data processing operation might result in significant negative or harmful consequences was 
so high it outweighed any potential benefits that the processing of those data would otherwise accrue. 
A rights-based theorist, alternatively, may hold the view that a substantive data protection rules should 
only be engaged when the risk was such that the processing of data to be undertaken came at an 
unacceptable price relative to any competing rights held by affected individuals. A Dignitarian theorist 
would outright object to any processing of data capable of compromising human dignity in any 
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circumstances. As noted previously, certain data processing activities undertaken as a part of big data 
analytics may generate an explicit loss of freedom for people make decisions regarding their own lives.71 
As free will is integral to most understandings of human dignity, the mere presence of a possibility that 
a particular data processing operation might lead to such an eventuality may cause Dignitarian ethicists 
to object to certain data processing activities in their entirety; the idea of a risk management-based 
approach to personal data would be moot. This is a point alluded to by Aldhouse, who when advocating 
a shift to a risk management-based approach to personal data, recognises the opposition such a move 
would surely evoke from those who hold dear the German doctrine of informational self-
determination.72 Quite clearly, therefore, reaching a consensus as to an acceptable level of risk in the 
immediate context would be extremely difficult. Another important relevant issue is the fact that even 
within these three distinct ethical constituencies there may yet be further divisions. Empirical research 
has indicated, for instance, that attitudes to risk tend to differ drastically between persons of different 
age groups, genders, and personality types, as well as being heavily affected by factors such as peer 
pressure and social status.73  
Accordingly, from this hypothetical scenario we might deduce that even if a broad consensus between 
policymakers and regulators could be reached as to an acceptable level of risk, the abovementioned 
difficulties in respect of identifying and quantifying risks in the big data context notwithstanding, it is 
conceivable that a not insignificant number of individuals within Europe would consider whatever the 
conclusion might be to be illegitimate or otherwise unsatisfactory.74 This could prove to be severely 
problematic for any risk management-based approach to data protection because, as has been widely 
noted in the literature, a perceived lack of legitimacy is one of the primary reasons for why, historically, 
numerous high-profile regulatory regimes have ended in failure.75  
Yet again, however, even if the design-related challenges considered thus far could be successfully 
negotiated, there would still likely be further complications. When devising risk any management-based 
approach to data protection, for instance, it will be important for regulators to bear in mind the fact that, 
generally speaking, the actors they purport to regulate – in this case, primarily individuals and 
organisations handling and processing large quantities of personal data – can interact quite differently 
across different regulatory tasks, and that cultures and attitudes to regulation may differ within different 
limbs of the actors themselves.  
In respect of data protection regulators and firms undertaking big data analytics, for instance, some parts 
of a particular firm (e.g. individual departments) might be more amenable to regulation than others. 
Furthermore, even if such a firm’s response to regulation was not internally fragmented, said firm may 
                                                          
71 See above at n.27. 
72 Aldhouse, F. (n 1) pg.418. 
73 A study undertaken in Switzerland in 2005 involving 388 randomly selected individuals strongly suggested 
that an individual’s general trust and general confidence, as well as their age and gender, have an impact of their 
perception of risks, particularly those associated with emerging technologies. See: Siegrist, M. et al. (2005) 
“Perception of risk: the influence of general trust, and general confidence”, Journal of Risk Research 8(2), 
pp.145-156. See also: Lahno, A. and Serra-Garcia, M. (2015) “Peer effects in risk taking: Envy or conformity?”, 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 50(1), pp.73-95; Rohde, I and Rohde, K. (2015) “Managing social risks – 
tradeoffs between risks and inequalities”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 51(2), pp.103-124; Nicholson, N. et 
al. (2005) “Personality and domain-specific risk taking”, Journal of Risk Research 8(2), pp.157-176.  
74 This is despite the fact that recent research has suggested that individuals often agree that greater protection of 
personal data is a desirable goal. See: ICO (2015) “Data protection rights: what the public want and what the 
public want from Data Protection Authorities”, available at: https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-
ico/documents/1431717/data-protection-rights-what-the-public-want-and-what-the-public-want-from-data-
protection-authorities.pdf and DataIQ (last accessed July 2016) “Consumers give firms false personal data due 
to a lack of trust”, available at: http://www.dataiq.co.uk/news/201505/consumers-admit-lying-about-personal-
data-due-lack-trust 
75 Brownsword, R. and Goodwin, M. (2012) Law and the technologies of the twentieth century. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pg.61. 
prove to be highly resistant and uncooperative in relation to the work undertaken by the regulator in 
respect of investigating possible risks, but it may be very compliant once its behaviour is placed at issue 
(i.e. in the event an errant practice was unearthed).76 Moreover, the use of risk management-based 
analyses to guide regulatory operations may, as a general rule, prove far more helpful for some tasks as 
opposed to others. In the present context of big data analytics it should not be assumed, for instance, 
that the use of a particular mode of risk management-based analysis as a means of detecting risk in a 
particular type of big data analytics operation would necessarily identify the existence of risks inherent 
in other operations of a similar, but different, nature.77  
Accordingly, whilst the use of risk analyses in the data protection field may prove a useful basis for 
detecting high-risk actors (e.g. a large data analytics firm), it may not necessarily be especially useful 
in terms of identifying which individual aspects of the operations of such actors (i.e. particular analytics 
operations) are deserving of regulatory attention. In any event, the identification of a high level of risk 
(again, assuming it would be possible to make such a determination) may provide some indication that 
a regulatory intervention may have to be made into a certain data processing activity undertaken by a 
particular big data analytics firm, but would not in itself necessarily provide any indication as to how 
any prospective regulatory response ought to be shaped as a means of reducing that level of risk. This 
is well highlighted by a fictional example provided by Baldwin and Cave:  
‘Two firms with similarly high risk scores may…be respectively well-intentioned, and ill-
informed, or ill-intentioned and ill-informed. The former may respond well to an educative 
program while the latter is unlikely to. The former does not need to be met with a punitive 
threat; the latter may have to be.’78 
Designing and developing risk analyses which are sufficiently fine-grained to accommodate all such 
nuances, rather than settling for a rudimentary one-size-fits-all mode of evaluation, may prove far from 
straightforward, but is another issue that has received scant attention in the data protection literature 
advocating for the adoption of risk management-based approaches to personal data. 
4.2. Challenges of enforcement and application 
In addition to the abovementioned design challenges associated with setting an acceptable level of risk, 
and devising evaluations by which such risks can be assessed, there may also be further complications 
that would later arise in respect of putting risk management-based regulatory frameworks into practice, 
as well as their subsequent enforcement.  
Firstly, given the fact that, generally speaking, risk management-based models of regulation are 
necessarily geared towards events that may happen in the future, if a predicted risk does not materialise 
it can be difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate that its failure to manifest was in any way resultant 
of the regulator’s actions.79 In effect, this means that the assessment of the quality and performance any 
risk management-based approach to the concept of personal data, once constructed and put into 
operation, would inevitably be extremely difficult to undertake. This is problematic, as being able to 
identify the successes and shortcomings of any regulatory regime is clearly paramount in terms of 
assessing its overall quality. 80  The construction of any method or metric against which such a 
determination could be made or undertaken is something on which the existing data protection literature 
does not examine in any meaningful way. In so doing, this precisely highlights another area where 
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further research and more in-depth thinking about the precise practical implications of adopting a risk 
management-based approach to personal data is required.  
Perhaps more troublingly, however, regulating on the basis of risks which would in many cases likely 
be largely unknowable, such as those inherent in the big data environment, could inadvertently create 
perverse incentives for organisations handling large quantities of personal data, or those which use 
personal data for sophisticated analytical purposes, to err on the side of caution when attempting to 
determine whether they are bound by any regulatory obligations. It has been suggested in the risk 
management literature, for instance, that risk management, when done well, should be inherently 
precautionary in respect of perceived risks and harms.81 In situations where notable and obvious risks 
can be identified, for instance, the taking of reasonable or sensible precautions is thought to be highly 
prudent. However, it has also been noted that the taking of reasonable or justified precautions becomes 
extremely challenging in situations of considerable complexity or uncertainty, as they demand an 
understanding of the potential false positives as well as false negatives that can be derived from any 
relevant evidence relating to the risk that is to be managed.82  
The danger inherent in situations of this type is that the undertaking of such analyses can lead to overly 
precautionary approaches to the management of potential risks which, in turn, could lead to wider 
negative consequences. A risk management-based approach to personal data, such as those outlined 
above, may be particularly likely to encounter such troubles. For instance, given that the risk of an 
individual being identified or harmed as a result of specific data being processed as part of an individual 
data analytics operations would in many cases be extremely difficult to ascertain, rather than risking 
invoking, or breaching, the substantive tenets of data protection law, it is conceivable that data 
controllers would judge it safer to avoid undertaking certain analytical operations for fear of acting 
unlawfully and being penalised. Accordingly, this could effectively usher in a regulatory culture which 
goes beyond what might be described as sensible precautions and, in fact, could be said to embody the 
much maligned, and altogether more heavy-handed precautionary principle. 
The precautionary principle suggests that decision-making bodies should take precautions to guard 
against certain harms, even in the event there is no clear evidence of such harms occurring, 
notwithstanding the costs of such action. In other words, the precautionary principle holds that if an 
action or policy has a suspected risk of causing harm, in the absence of consensus that the action or 
policy is not harmful the burden of proof that the action is not harmful will fall on those taking the 
action. Quite simply, it requires proof that a certain activity will not, or is very unlikely to, cause harm 
before it should be permitted.83 The principle has long been a staple of environmental law,84 and it now 
seems there may be a chance of it entering the data protection field should a shift to a risk management-
based approach to the concept of personal data be initiated, particularly if the level of risk deemed 
acceptable was particularly difficult to satisfy.  
For instance, the standard of an acceptable risk proposed by those supportive of a shift to a risk-driven 
models of data protection appears to be that data should only be processed free of legal constraints if 
the risk of harm resulting from that processing is negligible, or at least less than substantial. Whilst this 
is not quite the ‘proof of harmlessness’ standard demanded by the precautionary principle, it is arguably 
not far removed, and would place a considerable demand on data controllers to prove that the data at 
their disposal either did not, or would be extremely unlikely to, give rise to any risk of harm. When 
considering the difficulties in making this determination, it does not seem implausible to suggest that, 
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given the high levels of uncertainty associated with big data, under such an arrangement data controllers 
would conceivably often end up finding themselves in positions where it would be more attractive to 
err on the side of caution and avoid undertaking a certain data analytics operation, rather than act, 
engage the substantive tenets of data protection law, and risk regulatory sanction. Such an approach 
would be heavily, rather than moderately, precautionary.  
As alluded to above, this would not necessarily be a development to be welcomed. The precautionary 
principle is a fiercely debated construct, and it is often propounded, for instance, that as a regulatory 
tool it is logically and theoretically suspect, and thus, that it is doubtful that initiatives which have the 
potential to embody it should ever be afforded a central role in any significant regulatory framework.85 
From a purely theoretical standpoint, and in even the best case scenario, it has been noted that in the 
face of an emergent risk the presumption that maintaining the status quo, instead of pursuing a concerted 
course of action, is worthy of priority over conscious change is without empirical foundation and, 
against the background of the unstoppable evolution of life, even illogical. We often, for example, have 
as little notion of how undesirable a future where a certain action or behaviour is prohibited would be 
as we do about how undesirable a future where the same behaviour is allowed.86 As noted at numerous 
times throughout this article, this is particularly likely to be true in respect of big data analytics 
operations and their possible consequences.  
It is also worth noting that the cost of overly liberal use of precautionary-type regulatory approaches 
has historically, in several notable instances, come in the shape of lost commercial and economic 
advancement could have answered real societal needs.87 Furthermore, it can be argued when applied 
fully and logically, the precautionary principle effectively cannibalises itself.  If, for instance, the 
principle was applied rigidly to the idea of precautionary regulation itself, according to the principle’s 
burden of proof approach, advocates of precautionary regulation would be required to demonstrate to a 
certainty, or at least a near certainty, the absence of counterproductive effects that would stem from said 
regulation itself. The practical consequences of precautionary regulation, however, are so uncertain that 
its advocates typically could not meet this burden, and the precautionary principle would prohibit its 
own use.88 To many, observers in the risk research field these are all assertions that are serious enough 
to justify some strong reservations about the precautionary principle, or indeed risk management-based 
regulatory practices that could potentially give rise to it.89 
It is not just in general terms, however, that the precautionary principle is thought to be suspect. Writing 
in the context of modern information technologies, and particularly the way in which such technologies 
and the law are in a permanent state of mismatch, Thierer notes that many calls for fresh legislative and 
regulatory action in response to problems raised by contemporary data processing technologies are 
premised on precautionary principle logic, and rest on the assumption that since many of the relevant 
recent technological advances could pose some theoretical danger or risk, public bodies should prevent 
people from using them unless it can be proved that they will not cause any harm. In particular, he offers 
the following caution: 
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‘…The views set forth by some of these scholars represent a rather succinct articulation of 
precautionary principle thinking as applied to modern data collection practices. They are 
essentially claiming that – because there are various privacy risks associated with data 
collection and aggregation – policymakers should consider pre-emptive and potentially 
restrictive approaches to the initial collection and aggregation of data. The problem with that 
logic should be obvious, however, and as identified by the late political scientist and risk 
analysis expert Aaron Wildavsky, “if you can do nothing without knowing how it will turn out, 
you cannot do anything at all”. Best case scenarios will never develop if we are gripped with 
fear by the worst case scenarios and try to pre-emptively plan for them with policy 
interventions.’90 
It is not difficult to draw comparisons between Thierer’s warning and the risk management-based 
approach to the concept of personal data considered earlier in the article. As outlined in the opening 
sections of the article, the analysis of big data is likely to yield considerable societal and economic 
benefits.91 It is not difficult to see, for instance, how adopting a precautionary approach to the regulation 
of these activities could potentially prevent many of these purported benefits from being realised. Given 
the huge difficulty in determining levels of risk, it arguably would make little sense for these substantial 
benefits to be foregone due to a data controller being unable to prove that the processing of certain data 
would not, or at least be very unlikely to, lead give rise to some risk of harm.  
However, a shift to risk management-based approach to the concept of personal data would undeniably 
have the potential to cause such outcomes and, in so doing, put the law on a collision course with the 
possibilities for innovation and economic and societal development inherent in big data analytics. It 
might potentially be argued, therefore, that in even a best-case scenario pursuing such an initiative 
would be inimical to the advancement of knowledge and societal development. According to this line 
of thinking, the potential risks associated with shifting to a risk management-based model of data 
protection are so severe, there should be considerable reservations about pursuing with such a course 
of action. Troublingly, however, as with the other challenges inherent in the creation and deployment 
of risk management-based approaches to personal data considered above, the majority of the data 
protection literature proposing the initiation of such a move pays scant attention to both the possibility 
of the emergence of a system of data protection in this vein, and the indeed the risk research literature 
which highlights and warns against the problems that this would necessarily entail.  
5. Conclusion 
As considered above at the article’s outset, the emergence of big data has brought forth a number of 
emergent problems which challenge the smooth operation of the European data protection framework. 
Whilst a process of change is underway in the area, it has become clear that the European data protection 
framework’s key concept of personal data is to be retained in future regulatory endeavours pertaining 
to the processing of data. This is despite the fact that there are reasons to believe that, as traditionally 
envisaged, it may no longer be fully fit for purpose in the emerging big data environment. Evidently, 
change will be needed if it is to be fully functional in the years to come.  
In light of the pressing need for legal reform and the identification of new ways forward, this article has 
highlighted the apparent general trend of a rise in appetite for an approach to the concept of personal 
data which can be described as risk management-based. A popular response of academics, regulators, 
and other observers alike, to big data’s emergent policy challenges, for instance, has been to propose a 
shift to a regulatory position whereby data protection law’s substantive rules are only be engaged in 
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instances where the processing of data poses significant risks of harm, or other negative consequences, 
to individual persons.  
In so doing, these proposals essentially bring together, or at least bring into closer alignment, the fields 
of law, regulation, and risk research. However, as things stand, all is not well with this arrangement. 
Despite the proposals bringing these disciplines closer together, many of the observers counselling for 
the adoption of risk management-based approach to the concept of personal data have apparently 
overlooked several important issues widely traversed in the risk research literature in any meaningful 
way.  
Particularly, for instance, a survey of the risk research literature reveals that, generally speaking, there 
are numerous complex challenges associated with the identification, evaluation, and minimisation of 
risks that arise in conjunction with attempts to deal with complex situations. The big data policy 
challenges facing the European data protection framework are undoubtedly complex in nature, but yet, 
in spite of this, scant attention appears to have been paid to these challenges in the legal literature 
pertaining to data protection law and its reform.  
Despite the appetite for risk management-based models of data protection becoming more pronounced, 
therefore, there are still an array of severely challenging questions to be asked in respect of how risks 
in the big data context should be quantified, how they should be evaluated, what level of risk ought to 
be considered acceptable or tolerable, and what could be done to ensure that risk-management based 
approaches to data protection law and policy do not lead to overly precautionary outcomes.  
As outlined in the article’s introduction, it was not the intention of the author to counsel against the 
adoption of risk management-based approaches to the concept of personal data, nor to risk management-
based approaches to data protection regulation more generally, but to instigate much needed debate and 
discussion in respect of the abovementioned perplexing nascent issues. Whilst risk management-based 
regulatory strategies may have thus far emerged as popular, and potentially promising, responses to 
some of big data’s emergent challenges, it is clear there is still a way to go before debate in this area of 
data protection reform can be brought to a close. Accordingly, what the present situation now represents 
is an excellent opportunity for scholars and policymakers to close the gap between legal and risk-related 
scholarship, and for future inter-disciplinary research. It is hoped that this article may act as a starting 
point and catalyst towards the realisation of this potential.   
 
 
